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Introduction
The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office has recently begun talking
about the challenge of 'climate security', and former United Nations Secretary
General Kofi Annan has said that “Global climate change must take its place
alongside the threats of conflict, poverty and the proliferation of deadly
weapons that have traditionally monopolized first-order political attention”.
Climate change poses clears risks to Australia's interests in trade, aid and
political stability in Asia. This not inconsiderable risk poses some complex
challenges to Australian foreign policy. This paper explores the risks climate
change poses to security in Asia and the options for Australian foreign policy. 
Climate Change
Since the industrial revolution about 200 years ago, human activities such as
land clearing and the burning of oil and coal have increased the concentration
of most greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. These emissions have thickened
the blanket of gases that trap heat in the atmosphere, leading to warming of
the atmosphere and the earth's land and ocean surfaces. In turn, this warming
has meant that the atmospheric and oceanic processes that redistribute heat
from the equator to the poles are becoming more vigorous. By the year 2100
global mean surface temperature is projected to increase by between 1.1 and
6.4°C, and global mean sea level is projected to rise by between 18 and 59 cm,
although this latter projection excludes the possibility of increased melting
from ice sheets, which would result in sea-level rise in excess of 1 meter by the
end of the century.1 The global hydrological cycle is likely to be more
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vigorous, with the prospect of more intense climatic extremes such as
heatwaves, droughts, floods and cyclones.
These changes pose myriad risks to ecosystems and the people that
depend on them. The nature of risks differs according to the characteristics of
social and ecological systems. Some ecosystems - such as in the Arctic - are
very sensitive to changes in temperature, while others - such as northern
China - are very sensitive to changes in rainfall. Still others, like low-lying
coasts comprised of soft materials such as sand and silt are very sensitive to
sea-level rise. Given that many small island states are entirely coastal systems
with freshwater resources that are easily contaminated by saline incursion,
many of these - including many of Australia's nearest neighbours - are highly
at risk from the combined effects of sea-level rise, coral bleaching, more severe
droughts and floods, and increased cyclone intensity. Indeed, for Kiribati, the
Maldives, the Marshall Islands, Tokelau and Tuvalu, which are entirely
comprised of coral atolls, climate change is their main security risk.
People are vulnerable to ecosystem changes according to their
dependence on ecosystems for their livelihoods, the extent to which those
ecosystems are sensitive to climate change, and their capacity to adapt to these
changes. Capacity to adapt is a function of access to economic resources,
technologies, information and skills, the degree of equity in a society, and the
quality of governance. It generally follows that low-income people and
societies are more vulnerable to climate change than wealthy people and
societies. Climate change is therefore a global justice issue: the societies most
responsible for the emissions of greenhouse gases are the least vulnerable
because of the adaptive capacity conferred by the wealth they have generated
through polluting forms of development. For example, the United States, the
world's largest economy, is responsible for 30 percent of the CO2 emitted
between 1900 and 1999; over the same time frame, the European Union
countries were responsible for 22 percent.2 On a per capita basis, people in
Australia, the United States, Germany, Russia and the United Kingdom are the
world's largest emitters of CO2.3 This context should inform Australia's
responses to the security risks of climate change in Asia. 
Climate Change in Asia: Risks and Impacts
The latest report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
identifies the major impacts of climate change in Asia as being increased flood
 
risk in the next two to three decades as glaciers in the Himalayas melt,
followed by decreased river flows as these glaciers contract. It projects long
term declines in freshwater availability across most of Asia affecting more
than a billion people by the year 2050, with associated impacts on agriculture.
The region's mega-deltas are at risk of flooding, and many natural resources
will likely become increasingly scarce. Finally, the report suggests that there
will be increases in morbidity and mortality due to water borne diseases
across much of the region. These and other changes are likely to slow
development.4
It is expected that surface air temperatures will increase, most notably in
northern latitudes and in winter temperatures. The number of hot spells is
likely to increase, while the number of cold spells is likely to decrease. In
South Asia research suggests an increase in summer monsoon rainfall with
more severe flooding, and a decrease in winter rainfall with more severe
droughts.5 In China, higher annual precipitation is likely in the central and
western regions, whereas in the North and Northeast annual rainfall is
expected to decrease. Annual rainfall may increase in the North of Indonesia
and the Philippines, but decrease to the South of Indonesia.6 Across the region
greater extremes of rainfall are expected while tropical cyclones may become
more intense. 
Sea-levels are expected to rise at an increased rate of up to 6 mm/year.7
In some regions tectonic movement and ground subsidence are likely to lead
to more rapid rates of relative sea-level rise, perhaps 70-90 cms by the year
2050 in the Yellow River Delta.8 In the unlikely event that the West Antarctic
Ice Sheet melts, sea-levels will rise rapidly by over a meter by the end of this
century. 
In the Yellow River catchment, declining rainfall is already exacerbating
water scarcity driven by industrialisation and urbanisation, causing periodic
water shortages for many of its 130 million farmers.9 Increasing saltwater
intrusion is already problem in many coastal areas of China, India and
Bangladesh.10 In the future, climate change is likely to be a far more
significant driver of these water problems, including along the Yellow, Red
and Mekong rivers. Rivers fed by glaciers and melting permafrost are likely to
receive increased flows for some time, followed by decreased flows as the
supply of water dwindles. Rivers supplied by rainfall are likely to experience
increasing flow variability as rainfall events become both more intense but less
frequent. These changes in flow will exacerbate flooding, water scarcity, water
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pollution and water distribution (sometimes across national boundaries),
presenting challenges to water resource infrastructure, water resource
management, agricultural and industrial production, human health, and
processes of determining equitable and sustainable allocations of water to
competing users. 
There is already a problem in South East Asia with forest fires that are
caused by both forest fragmentation due to logging and agriculture, and dry
spells in El Nino years. Such fires are likely to become more frequent due to
climate change. Whether or not El Nino Southern Oscillation (ENSO) events
become more intense, climate change is likely to cause more prolonged dry
spells and increasing temperatures that will exacerbate the problem of forest
fires and their impacts on health, production, and regional relations. 
Many of Asia's cities and much of its industrial production are located in
the coastal zone and on river deltas. Over 70% of China's GDP is produced in
its coastal zone and this seems likely to increase.11 Declining flows of
sediment coupled with rising sea-levels and stronger storms may cause deltas
to shrink. If so, millions of people and billions of dollars of capital may be
subject to inundation and flooding. Storms and storm surges in the Bay of
Bengal already causes tens of thousands of deaths; rising sea-levels, stronger
storms and population growth may conspire to increase the number of lives
lost in the future. 
Marine species are a key source of protein throughout Asia and fisheries
and aquaculture are key economic activities. Most studies suggest
productivity in both types of fishery will decline due to climate change. For
deep-water fisheries, the migration of species is likely to become less
predictable as water temperatures are a key determinant of fish movements
and the distribution of warm and cold waters may change.12 Net primary
productivity in tropical oceans may also decline. More unpredictable catches
coupled with growing demand may see increasing exploitation and over-
harvesting of fish stocks. The common property nature of high seas fish stocks
complicates management of catch rates and fishing techniques. Rising sea-
levels, episodes of sudden increases in sea-surface temperatures, coastal
erosion, increasing salinity and increasing storm damage may all undermine
production from aquaculture. 
Changes in temperature and rainfall will affect food production and, in
conjunction with possible impacts on fisheries and poverty, may undermine
food security for Asia's poor. Production of all cereals across all of Asia is
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expected to decline which, coupled with rising populations, means domestic
production is likely to struggle to meet demand and lead to higher food
prices. More intense droughts and floods may trigger subsistence production
crises, which together with higher food prices will increase the risk of hunger
and malnutrition. For example, given the existing conditions of thin soils,
variable climate, political instability and rural poverty in East Timor climate
change poses serious risks to nutrition and possibly famine in that country.13
Climate change is likely to have other harmful effects on human health.
Outbreaks of cholera are associated with warming episodes such as occur
during El Nino years, while diarrhoeal diseases are also associated with
warming and flooding events.14 Warming in higher latitudes also increases the
risk of more intense and more extensive infection of people by malaria and
dengue fever. Morbidity and mortality dues to extremes events such as floods
and fires are also likely to increase. Declining water quality may increase the
numbers of people affected by Giardia, salmonella and cryptosporidium.
These affects on mortality and morbidity will strain health services, demand
increasing amounts of emergency assistance, and undermine labour
productivity. 
Challenges to Australian Foreign Policy
There are two broad strategies to reduce the impacts of climate change. The
first, called mitigation, entails reducing emissions of greenhouse gases, which
can be achieved through switching from fossil fuel to renewable energy
sources, improving energy efficiency, and, rather more contentiously,
sequestering carbon in plants, underground reservoirs, and possibly in oceans,
and the use of nuclear power. The second strategy to reduce the impacts of
climate change is called adaptation, which entails taking measures to reduce
the impacts of climate change on people, places, and sectors. 
There is a widespread view internationally that Australia could and
should do more in terms of mitigation. The criticism arises from Australia's
hard bargaining over the final text of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol - that part of the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) which
imposed mandatory emission reduction targets on developed countries and
economies in transition. In these negotiations Australia argued that, due to its
special economic characteristics, its Kyoto Protocol target should be an 8%
increase in emissions beyond 1990, whereas on average other countries
accepted a 5% reduction below 1990 levels. Australia also argued for a series
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of 'loopholes' in measures to account for and reduce emissions. 
In this stance Australia was not acting alone and was closely supported
by the United States, Japan, Norway, Canada and New Zealand. However, of
this group only Australia and the United States have yet to ratify the Kyoto
Protocol and remain unwilling to do so, thereby attracting the ire of the
international community who, having made concessions to these countries,
reasonably expected that they would then ratify the Kyoto Protocol. The many
critics of Australia and the United States accuse them both of undermining the
legitimacy of the climate regime, and of 'free riding' on actions to reduce
climate change in that they avoid incurring the costs of action but will share in
the benefits of reduced emissions. For its part, the Australian Government
argues that it has indeed met its Kyoto Protocol target of restricting emissions
to an 8% increase beyond 1990 levels, even though it has not ratified the Kyoto
Protocol.
Australia's stance on the Kyoto Protocol is a security gamble. In effect
anti-Kyoto industrial and energy interests have been favoured ahead of
Australia's long-term global and regional reputation. As yet climate change
has not become so important that Australia's interests in the region have been
obviously harmed by its anti-Kyoto position. However, as the impacts of
climate change increase and become more obviously climate-related,
Australia's current actions may come to be viewed more harshly. Failure to
soften Australia's position on climate change could impair its influence in
regional and global affairs. 
The Australian Government has recently engaged in a new multilateral
initiative that seeks reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Officially
announced in July 2005, the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development
and Climate (AP6) involves six countries (Australia, China, India, Japan, the
Republic of Korea and the United States) and seeks 'to develop, deploy and
transfer cleaner, more efficient technologies and to meet national pollution
reduction, energy security and climate change concerns, consistent with the
principles of the UNFCCC'. 
6 CLIMATE CHANGE AND SECURITY IN ASIA / JON BARNETT
 
Table 1 Members of the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development
and Climate and their greenhouse gas emissions (data from UNFCCC
Secretariat) 
Country Greenhouse Gas Emissions Share of world total %
(excluding land use land-use 
change and forestry), Teragrams 







The AP6 group accounts for over 40% of global greenhouse gas emissions,
close to half of world production, and 45% of the world's population (see
Table 1). It also includes the largest emitters of greenhouse gases in the region
(except for Indonesia whose official emissions are larger than the Republic of
Korea's and unofficially - given very high rates of deforestation - may be
larger than all but China's and the United States). The AP6 does not set
binding emission reduction targets like the Kyoto Protocol, it includes some
technologies that are much opposed in the UN climate regime - notably clean
coal, carbon capture and storage, and civilian nuclear power - and it is poorly
funded. The Australian government argues that AP6 is not the government's
only response to Kyoto but is an alternative approach that has value as a
forum for regional dialogue on emissions reduction. 
The AP6 seems to most observers to be an attempt to create an
alternative climate regime competing for legitimacy with the UNFCCC. In
general, it has not been well received by countries outside the partnership.
The AP6 may shore up Australia's relations with key Asian countries on the
issue of climate change, at least in the short term. However, it should be
remembered that Japan has accepted a binding emissions target under the
Kyoto Protocol, that Korea, India and China have ratified, acceded or
approved the Protocol, and that they are engaged in emission reduction
activities with developed country partners as facilitated by the Protocol.
Further, China, India and Korea may yet well accept emission reduction
targets under the impending 2012 post-Kyoto agreement should the terms of
the agreement and the nature of the targets be acceptable. This may be more













likely as they experience increasing climate impacts and if existing efforts
demonstrate that the costs of reducing emissions are less than the benefits. In
other words, beyond Australia and the United States the other countries in the
AP6 are no doubt hedging their bets. So, the Australian government should
not pin all its hope on the AP6 and would do well to maintain its stake in the
UN climate change regime. While it seems reluctant to do this through
activities to reduce emissions, it may improve its standing through actions to
facilitate adaptation in Asia and elsewhere (discussed below). 
Policy Options
There are at least three broad options for a future Australian climate change
policy. The first is to continue on the business as usual pathway. The second
option is to increase actions to assist countries to adapt to climate change,
even if no action is taken to ratify the Kyoto Protocol or otherwise adopt a
binding target for emissions reductions. The third option includes significantly
increased assistance for adaptation, ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, and
taking a leadership role in developing an effective and credible post-Kyoto
agreement. Of these, the first seems untenable given the risk of Australian
isolation as perceptions of climate impacts in the region and globally grow, as
international negotiations develop on a post-Kyoto agreement to include
China and India, and as the U.S. political landscape changes. The following
discussion concerns only the second and third options.
The second option for a future Australian climate change policy is to
increase actions to assist countries to adapt to climate change. It is notable that
the 2006 Aid White paper identifies adaptation to climate change as a key new
area of activity. However, planning for adaptation to climate change is
confounded by uncertainty as to the magnitude, timing and location of
impacts. Donors such as Australia are faced with the prospect of investing
scarce resources in potentially expensive solutions to meet impacts that may
not materialize and whose magnitude is uncertain. A sensible adaptation
strategy is therefore to develop a society's general capacity to cope with
change by building up its institutional structures and human resources whilst
maintaining and enhancing the integrity of ecosystems. In other words,
actions to advance ecologically sustainable development can be seen as
adaptations. Activities such as this have the benefit of being 'no regrets'
activities that would be well received in Asia regardless of climate change. Yet
such actions are not so obviously discretely 'climate change', although they
could easily enough be labelled as such. Bilateral support from Australia to
Asia for adaptation may be preferable to support channelled through the
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financial mechanism of the UNFCCC because it tends to favour discrete
projects on clearly identified climate problems rather than the kind of general
sustainability activities that are required (let alone the kinds of activities that
Asian countries might themselves see as priorities). 
Considering the kinds of adverse outcomes of climate change suggested
above, a range of projects could enhance adaptation to climate change in Asia.
On the issue of rivers and water more generally, appropriate solutions vary
from place to place. In the Yellow River, for example, adaptation would do
well to focus less on the traditional Chinese approach of water resource
infrastructure and more on managing the growing demands for water for
urban and industrial users through improved efficiency and recycling and
through designing institutions that can equitably balance the competing
demands for water among urban, industrial and agricultural users, whilst
maintaining enough flows to maintain ecosystem health. Better water
management institutions are arguably needed throughout Asia, yet in some
river systems gains can still be made through infrastructure improvements. In
the case of the region's trans-boundary rivers, such as the Mekong and
Ganges-Brahmaputra, dialogue facilitated by neutral third parties is essential
to ensure peaceful co-management and sustainable allocations of water.
In terms of the problem of fires and smoke haze, adaptations include
controlling the rate and nature of nature of logging, encouraging farmers to
move from shifting to settled cultivation, substituting production from native
forests to plantations, better surveillance of forestry activities, and
strengthened regional dialogue and cooperation on forest management and air
quality. Efforts to slow the rate of deforestation are also short-term mitigation
measures because forested areas are carbon sinks. This is the focus of the
Australian Government's 'Global Inititiative on Forests and Climate', which
was announced in March 2007.
Pelagic fisheries also call for regional approaches. Better understanding
is needed of fish stocks and sustainable harvesting levels. There is a need for
adaptive management of pelagic as well as artisanal fisheries to monitor
stocks and flows and to adjust harvesting regimes accordingly. Improved
planning of coastal developments to sustain aquaculture is also desirable. 
Managing the problems of coastal change requires improved institutions
for coastal planning including integrated coastal zone management,
accommodating likely future changes in new structures, shifting agricultural
activities inland, coastal protection measures where appropriate and largely of
the 'soft' (i.e. planting mangroves) kind, and controlling the nature of coastal
developments so that they do not exacerbate changes that increase
vulnerability to erosion and flooding.
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Solutions to the risk of declining agricultural production lie in
improving growing practices through more efficient irrigation technologies
and extending irrigation to areas currently not irrigated. Improved soil
conservation practices and careful introduction of appropriate high yielding
varieties of crops can also help. Mechanisation of agriculture and land use
changes to achieve economies of scale may also assist - although the impact of
these changes on rural livelihoods requires careful consideration. In terms of
food security, diversifying sources of rural income, early warning systems,
democratisation, and subsidised food prices can all help alleviate chronic and
transitory food shortages. All these are far more effective and sustainable that
short-term relief in the form of food aid.
Solutions to the kinds of health problems that might arise from climate
change lie in improved health services, enhanced public health campaigns,
poverty reduction, improved disaster management institutions, and closer
monitoring of vector-borne diseases. AusAid has a growing focus on health
programs in the region, which is a 'no regrets' policy in terms of climate
change. Improving disaster preparedness, response and recovery institutions
is a cross cutting theme for all sectors and is clearly justifiable given that
cyclones, floods and droughts already impact on development in much of
Asia. 
Efforts to improve the quality of governance, development, and
planning in urban areas is an important adaptation strategy both to sustain
urban development and to better accommodate potential influxes of migrants.
Yet it is desirable that efforts in urban areas not occur at the expense of rural
development lest it further exacerbates rural-urban inequality and compound
the problem of rural-urban migration. Sustainable pathways to rural
development are also required to build adaptable rural communities
dependent on resilient ecosystems. Many of the most vulnerable rural
communities are those that lack access to basic services such as clean drinking
water and electricity. Rural electrification using clean energy technologies is
simultaneously an efficient development, adaptation, and climate mitigation
strategy.
Australia is well positioned to foster the kinds of actions required to
facilitate adaptation to climate change in Asia because of its advanced
agricultural technologies and knowledge, its experience with cutting edge
resource management practices in the coastal zone, fisheries and water, its
capacities in the areas of medicine, health care and disaster management, and
its demonstrated capacity to foster regional dialogue.
The third option for a future Australian climate change policy is a Kyoto-
plus strategy that combines significantly increased assistance for adaptation as
described above, ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, and taking a leadership
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role in developing an effective and credible post-Kyoto agreement. To be
ecologically effective and politically credible, a post-Kyoto agreement must
include China and India. Emissions from these two countries are already large
and growing rapidly. There are many gains to be made in slowing the growth
of emissions from these countries through the transfer of existing technologies.
As a regional partner with China and India, Australia is in a position to take
the lead in including them in a post-Kyoto regime. In so doing it could
'redeem' its reputation on this issue and in the region.15
Conclusion
Climate change looms as a significant risk to the people, economies and
political systems of Asia. It also looms as a risk to Australia's relations with the
region, and this warrants a coherent regional strategy. The prospect of such a
strategy now seems more likely given the dramatic change in climate
(geo)politics since late 2006. Al Gore's film The Inconvenient Truth, Nicholas
Stern's report The Economics of Climate Change, and the release of the IPCC's
‘Fourth Assessment Report’ have all raised the profile of the issue, showing
that its impacts will be dramatic, and that it is economically beneficial to take
actions to significantly reduce emissions. In Australia the 2006 drought and
associated bushfires, and in the U.S. the impact of Hurricane Katrina have
both raised the profile of climate change as a domestic political issue.  It was a
significant factor in the Democrat victory in the U.S. 2006 Congressional
elections and will be a significant factor in both the next Presidential election
in the U.S. and the next Federal election in Australia. Australia should be very
concerned about being isolated by a Bush reversal on Kyoto, a Democrat
President and Congress embracing the Kyoto Protocol and successor
agreements, and Chinese and/or Indian adoption of an emissions reduction
target in the successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol. Given these domestic
pressures in Australia, in Australia's key climate change ally in the United
States, and the risk of a sudden change in sensibilities in Asia, it seems
inevitable that Australia's policy on climate change will change. The issue is
how, and by how much?
Given the magnitude of the risks climate change poses to human and
national security in Asia, and to Australia's relations with the region, and
given Australia's poor reputation on this issue, of the three policy options
presented the most optimal would be the Kyoto-plus strategy. This involves
significant assistance for adaptation in the region, ratification of the Kyoto
Protocol, and a leadership role in developing an effective and credible post-
Kyoto agreement. 
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